610. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/


/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 295. Secret.

SUBJECT
US Policy Toward South Africa--Status Report on NSAM 295

The July 31, 1965 Status Report on NSAM 295/2/ raises some questions which deserve a close look.

/2/Document 609.

1. Would US policy objectives be furthered if we were to enlist the support of friendly countries with diplomatic representation in South Africa to join in US-UK approaches to the South African Government on apartheid and the South West Africa case?

2. Is there any political advantage to be gained for the US and its policy objectives by transferring our space tracking facilities in South Africa before events force us to do so?

R. W. Komer

611. Memorandum of Conversation/1/


/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 S AFR-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hall on September 8 and approved in S on September 21.
Ambassador Taswell said he had a verbal message from Foreign Minister Muller to deliver. The Foreign Minister wished to express his thanks for the Secretary's Note regarding the four officers/2/ and said it remained his earnest desire that there be no cause for further trouble. The Foreign Minister would like to leave it there. He had approached the problem in a friendly manner and certainly desired no publicity. He was sorry the USG had not been more responsive. South Africa wanted friendly relations with the U.S. but, if there was any further trouble, more drastic steps would have to be taken.

/2/See Document 608. Telegram 206 to Pretoria, August 9, transmitted a message to Foreign Minister Muller from Secretary Rusk stating that he had found no evidence of improper conduct on the part of the four U.S. Foreign Service officers concerned and was satisfied that they had performed their official duties in accordance with normal and accepted practice for conduct of diplomatic representatives. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 S AFR)

The Secretary asked if the Foreign Minister would be going to New York for the General Assembly. The Ambassador said he would attend part of the session and is expected to reach New York about September 23. The Secretary said he might take up the matter with Foreign Minister at that time. He was not sure he understood the full implications of the Foreign Minister's message as conveyed by the Ambassador. Ambassador Taswell replied, the intent of the message was as follows: if there was any more difficulty with the officers in question, his government would have to declare them persona non grata with, he supposed, attendant and unfortunate publicity. The Secretary said if it should come to that, he would prefer formal to informal action. The Secretary then thanked the Ambassador for the Foreign Minister's message and ended the interview.
Washington, September 13, 1965.

SUBJECT
20th General Assembly--Strategy Session

On Saturday, there was rather a large meeting in State to discuss strategy for the 20th General Assembly which is scheduled to start on September 21. Rusk chaired the meeting which included Ball, Goldberg (accompanied by assorted aides), Tommy Thompson, Mann, Butch Fisher, Rostow, a number of regional and functional Assistant Secretaries, and a health contingent from IO. Here are the major items of discussion.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]

9. South Africa and Apartheid--Goldberg said that we must do something about our posture on this issue and went on to propose that the U.S. Government announce publicly a voluntary program to curb U.S. investment in South Africa. The proposal brought forth a number of reservations. Rusk said that moving into the human rights field with sanctions poses some tough problems and wondered what we are prepared to do about, for instance, Eastern Europe, Liberia, and countries with one-party regimes. Ball said that we could not expect the British to join us in this effort, and that the South Africans would surely retaliate in one way or another; as a matter of fact, there might be actions South Africa could take in the economic field that would really hurt. Ball went on to say that a voluntary program wouldn't work anyway. Others noted the ambiguity of the Africans themselves, some of whom still trade with South Africa.

Goldberg rebutted. It is true that we can't solve all the human rights problems of the world, but apartheid is something special; its enormity makes it so. We simply must square our position on this issue with our efforts in this area in our own country. And remember, we are not talking about sanctions but about a voluntary program. Soapy Williams supported Goldberg, noting that such a program would make us a lot more credible with the Africans. He went on to rebut the argument that such a voluntary program wouldn't work. Among other things, he said that banks are frequently asked by potential investors about prospects in South Africa and that the banks, at present, cannot discourage these people because "the Government has not taken a stance." Williams went on to say that his talks with one big investor--Engelhart (phonetic)--indicate that he probably would not have gone
in to South Africa had he clearly known our views.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]

GC

613. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An October 15 covering memorandum from Read to Bundy reads: "In response to Mr. Komer's memorandum of September 2, 1965, we have prepared the attached supplementary comment concerning the Department's status report of July 31, 1965, on National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964." See Document 610 for Komer's questions concerning the report.

COMMENTS ON STATUS REPORT ON NSAM NO. 295 OF APRIL 24, 1964--SOUTH AFRICA


Among the sixteen other nations with diplomatic representation in Pretoria, those most likely to lend useful support to US-UK approaches to the South African Government on South West Africa and related aspects of apartheid are Canada, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Australia, Sweden, Israel, Brazil and possibly Belgium. As indicated in the status report of July 31, 1965, the Department plans to approach such governments in Washington and in their respective capitals in a systematic series of briefings and efforts to enlist support following the next round of US-UK talks with the South African Foreign Minister. It is anticipated that this should take place soon after the Foreign Minister's return from the United Nations in October. Ultimately we would probably canvas all sixteen other nations with diplomatic representation in Pretoria except for Rhodesia and Portugal.

U.S. policy objectives would indeed be furthered if support could be enlisted for US-UK approaches from a number of these friendly countries. Some may wish to defer their separate representations to the South African Government until after the ICJ decision on South West Africa. However, it would be our aim to seek maximum action as the date for the decision approaches, while welcoming
additional overtures soon after the Court decision is announced.

2. Political advantage in transferring space-tracking facilities from South Africa, before events force us to do so

Important continuing U.S. military and scientific space requirements make it disadvantageous to withdraw U.S. space-tracking facilities from South Africa prior to July 1, 1996, when alternative facilities will be available and could be used with relatively minor impact on planned programs. The completion of these alternative facilities will substantially lessen military and scientific considerations from our planning. (We may, however, still have to take into account the six months' termination notice provided for in the DOD agreement; there is no such grace period in the NASA agreement.) Once the alternative facilities are ready, therefore, the decision as to their immediate use or their reservation for use only if we were forced to evacuate can be taken on largely political grounds.

United States-South Africa relations have become considerably strained as a result of the Independence incident, South African criticism of United States diplomatic receptions, South African efforts to remove certain U.S. diplomatic personnel, and public efforts by Verwoerd to apply racial restrictions to our space-tracking stations. The possibility therefore exists that the South African Government will unilaterally decide to terminate its space-tracking agreements with the United States. At present, South African action of this kind appears slight in view of Prime Minister Verwoerd's failure to follow up with any official request or action after his speech of June 25, 1965, in which he publicly aired the view that American personnel in such facilities are subject to racial restrictions, or after the United States publicly denied and rejected this view. The Prime Minister's more recent public statements have indicated a desire on the part of the South African Government to back away from the issue.

For the moment, therefore, the initiative on vacating present facilities in South Africa remains ours. To take that initiative could be politically advantageous in that such an act of dissociation would be approved by the Afro-Asian states. To take it with respect to the military tracking station alone would be fully consistent with our posture of caution in military relations with the South African Government.

In addition to their concentrated efforts to persuade the United States and others to institute economic and military sanctions against South Africa, the Afro-Asians have sought the termination of all agreements with South Africa, specifically citing our space facilities, which might in some way encourage South Africa's pursuit of its present racial policies. The transfer of American facilities out of South Africa would not diminish pressures for military and economic sanctions. However, since
any overt dissociation with South Africa would be welcomed by the Afro-Asians and others, would remove one element of criticism of our South Africa policy, and would strengthen our hand in counseling moderation pending an ICJ decision, there would be some political advantage in moving the stations as soon as alternative facilities are available.

It would seem of greater political advantage, however, to reserve such a step for use as one small way to bring psychological leverage on South Africa in connection with the ICJ proceedings on South West Africa.

The expected time of the decision (April-June 1966) is sufficiently close to the completion of alternative facilities to enable us to keep open the option of withdrawal from the tracking stations at our initiative in connection with the South West Africa issue. Such withdrawal would have more effectiveness if it were directly linked vis-a-vis both South Africa and the Afro-Asian states to the clearly delineated objective of producing South African compliance with the ICJ decision or were taken to show disapproval of a negative South African reaction to it. In the event of such a negative South African reaction, the tracking stations would probably become an unnecessary liability which could be jettisoned.

In the absence of new factors, we believe we should reserve decision on the question of withdrawal until July 1, 1966. In the meantime, the preparation of alternative facilities should proceed as rapidly as possible so that the option belongs to the United States.

614. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/

Washington, December 7, 1965, 7:28 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14 S AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of U.N. Political Affairs Patricia M. Byrne of IO/UNP; cleared by Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Williams, EUR Regional Planning and United Nations Adviser Edward T. Lampson, and Legal Adviser Leonard C. Meeker; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs David H. Popper. Repeated to London and Pretoria.1

1431. SPC-Apartheid. USUN's 2486 /2/ and 2531./3/ Dept concurs your recommendation abstention on general apartheid resolution as whole provided separate negative votes can be registered on operative paragraphs 1 and 7 and with strong statement explaining our position situation in South Africa not now threat
to peace within meaning Chapter VII and therefore sanctions inapplicable. We also agree your recommendations on paragraph votes./4/

/2/Telegram 2486 from USUN, December 3, transmitted the text of the draft resolution on apartheid supported by 45 Afro-Asian nations. (Ibid.)

/3/Telegram 2531 from USUN, December 6, reported that the U.S. Delegation recommended that the United States abstain on the resolution as a whole, provided that it had the opportunity to vote "no" on operative paragraphs 1 and 7, which called for economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa. (Ibid.)


Rusk

615. Memorandum From the Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Frutkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/


/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, to the Department of State's Acting Director of International Scientific and Technological Affairs Herman Pollack, and to NASA Administrator James E. Webb

SUBJECT
US Action toward South Africa

Since the conference you called in your office on impending South African questions, I have discussed this matter with Mr. Webb and wish to confirm the position I took for this agency in that discussion.

NASA fully appreciates the importance attached to a political crisis in relations with South Africa and has moved with the utmost dispatch to establish the agreed substitute facilities in three other locations. Delays in the Spanish area, over which we have had no control, make it possible that the South African situation might become critical before we are prepared to shift ground support coverage for the critical Apollo and Surveyor programs from South Africa to Spain. The US would then have to decide whether (1) to press a confrontation with South Africa and risk
a delay in the manned lunar program, or (2) to delay the political confrontation in order to assure continuity in the lunar landing program.

Obviously two considerations of great national importance are involved, both involving major national commitments before the world. The decision as to which should be given precedence, in the circumstances which exist at the time, must, we believe, be made with the full knowledge of the President./2/

/2/On December 16, Komor sent Frutkin a memorandum asking for the earliest date on which the alternative tracking facilities in Spain could be completed. He also asked for information on how NASA had prepared to assure continuity in the lunar landing program in the event of a confrontation between the United States and South Africa precipitated either by the Rhodesian crisis or by reactions to the coming ICJ decision in the South West Africa case. (Ibid.)

Arnold W. Frutkin/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

616. Memorandum From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/


/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, South Africa. Secret.

Dear Dean:

I share your concern over the grave questions of U.S. policy in South Africa, and regret that the importance of our tracking and data acquisition facilities there imposes certain restraints.

Specifically, if the South African facilities are denied to us before the alternative contingency facilities in Spain are available, we will, at the time this is definitely known, have to establish methods by which we can reschedule and thereby delay some of the planned Surveyor soft lander missions and/or some of the Orbiter mapping missions. This would be unavoidable because the single existing Madrid facility can support only one mission at a time. Our schedule during the last nine months of 1966 calls for simultaneous flights of Surveyor and Orbiter missions, but it is not possible to assure, for any substantial period in advance, which flight will be ready or which should have priority. Our problem will become one of
pressing forward with each project and deciding at the latest date possible the one to launch.

The information about the moon that these unmanned missions will provide is urgently needed to provide an adequate basis for making some of the most critical decisions relating to the execution of the Apollo manned lunar effort; delay in its acquisition will erode the already thin margins we have been able to retain for the program to land upon the moon within the decade.

In addition, the U.S.S.R. has already launched four spacecraft in a vigorous effort to achieve a successful unmanned lunar soft landing. Further delays in the Surveyor schedules would strongly reinforce their chances of being the first to accomplish this important mission, which would attract a great deal of attention.

Thus the delay would affect two important objectives.

The loss of the South African facilities would place us in the position of complete dependence upon the long-term availability of facilities in Spain to support our future missions for manned exploration of the moon.

We have already taken strong action to accelerate the timetable for the additional Madrid facility. We do not yet have access to the land but have assurances this can be obtained by the end of this month. If this materializes, the second Madrid station could possibly be operational as early as February 1967. We can identify no steps that would significantly shorten the construction and checkout schedule.

This situation argues for every effort to retain the South African facilities, at least through early 1967. If overriding policy considerations require actions that lead to the loss of these facilities, the risks involved in meeting the Apollo objective of a landing in this decade substantially increase and throw us one step nearer the possibility we may have to attempt a landing with men before we can get surface data from an unmanned vehicle. Further, we may well have to absorb the negative impact of a Soviet first in the unmanned soft landing area.

With high regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

James E. Webb/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Webb signed the original.
617. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)/1/


/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 S AFR. Secret.

Tom, I gather that we are about to decide whether to approve an export license for the sale of eight civilian Cessna aircraft to the South African Air Force. This issue is a tough one.

On the one hand, NSAM 295 on US Policy Toward South Africa calls for our arms embargo to remain in effect unless "further developments" warrant a change. On the other hand, does sale of civilian aircraft, even to the South African military amount to violation of that arms embargo?

To me the public relations disadvantages tend to outweigh the arguments that the sale is justified because it will help our balance of payments or that "if the US won't sell, someone else will." The amount involved is minor, and the legal justifications won't suffice to offset a likely burst of criticism at the very time when there is (a) significant South African support of the Rhodesian rebellion, (b) a Congressional hearing next month on apartheid, (c) increased racial and political repression in South Africa, (d) a decision of the ICJ adverse to South Africa anticipated in the South West Africa case, and (e) members of the OAU and UN are focusing attention on the remaining problems of racism and colonialism in Southern Africa.

The trouble caused by the reopening of the Rhodesian Information Office here in Washington shows the kind of furor which can be raised over such minor issues. I suspect the same would be the case in a Cessna sale. Wouldn't the small advantage to our balance of payments be more than offset by widespread domestic and international criticism of the USG?

Bob Komer

618. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer)/1/

SUBJECT
Cessna Aircraft for South Africa

The question is whether an export license should be granted for the export to South Africa of eight twin engine Cessna aircraft (Model 411) for 1.5 million dollars. An additional sale of $250,000 in spare parts may be requested later.

Senator Carlson and Senator Pearson point out that similar aircraft can readily be procured elsewhere by South Africa; that export licenses for the sale of 50 Cessna planes to South Africa have already been approved this year; that denial of the licenses may mean the loss by the manufacturer of future sales in South Africa ($39 million was the value of US aircraft exported to South Africa last year); and that refusal "will uselessly endanger" our gold position and "needlessly restrict an American manufacturer engaged in international commerce."

Ambassador Goldberg and the UN and African bureaus strongly urge that the license be denied. Ambassador Goldberg believes that statements of our officials made in the United Nations after clearance with the Department have already committed us to deny the license.

I have three recommendations:
First, the application for these particular eight aircraft be denied because:

a) These particular aircraft are intended to be registered in the South African Air Force and flown by Air Force pilots.

b) They are, I am informed, each to be equipped with a special type of radar and used by the South African Air Force for surveillance to locate smugglers. In case of hostilities they could, and probably would, be used for air reconnaissance and possibly for other military purposes. The sale could therefore be said to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963 which "3. Solemnly calls upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa."

Second, for the time being, that sales of this type of Cessna aircraft to South Africa be continued when it is determined that the end used is civilian rather than the military and when it is not equipped with special radar facilities. Radar facilities of the type normally used by aircraft for safety purposes could be provided.
Third, that no public statements or commitments be made, for the time being, that could result in the discontinuance of our engagement in trade in peaceful goods in South Africa. We have said in the United Nations that, in practice, "the embargo of the United States on all arms and military equipment to South Africa has extended to materials which are likely to be used for or are easily adaptable to military purposes." If this statement were strictly interpreted, virtually all US trade with South Africa would be prohibited, since it is hard to imagine what exports would not be consumed or used in the event of war by the South African government or population. Clearly this would not be in our interest.

On February 25, Komer sent Mann a memorandum that reads: "Tom, I fully agree with the three recommendations in your memorandum of February 24, 1966, on the sale of Cessna aircraft to South Africa. As set out in your memo, your interpretation of our arms embargo accurately reflects the intent of NSAM 295 from which our policy guidelines on this subject are derived." (Ibid.)/2/

/2/ Would you let me know if these three recommendations are acceptable as policy guidelines. Our export policy towards South Africa needs defining.

Thomas C. Mann

619. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 70-66


/1/ Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on June 2.

PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA ISSUE

Conclusions

A. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) will soon render its decision on the case brought against South Africa concerning its mandate over South-West Africa (SWA). Irrespective of the terms of the decision, we expect the black Africans and their sympathizers to take the occasion to press the UN to end apartheid in SWA
and eventually in South Africa itself. They will put particular pressure on the US and UK who, they believe, could bring South Africa to terms if they really tried. (Paras. 1, 8-9, 20)

B. South Africa, in order to improve its legal and political position, might comply with provisions of the judgment which did not dilute its control over SWA. South Africa is highly unlikely to give in to pressure for further steps and its opponents will probably seek strong UN action. Although the UK could ill afford to join full economic sanctions, it may not veto Security Council action and no other permanent member may do so. If, as is likely, economic sanctions were ineffective, the matter of military sanctions would arise, though sufficient support in the UN for such sanctions is highly unlikely. We do not believe that the South Africans would capitulate in the face of economic sanctions or the threat of military sanctions./2/ (Paras. 15-19)

/2/Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, dissents from the estimates in the last two sentences of this paragraph, because he believes that they depend significantly on future US policy decisions. Cf. his footnotes to paragraphs 18 and 19. [Footnote in the source text.]

C. The African states will portray firm US action against South Africa as the touchstone of US relations and influence in Africa. If the UN does not force South Africa to retreat, the Africans and their sympathizers will keep the issue alive, in the UN and out, and it will trouble Africa's relations with the West. (Paras. 20-22)

[Here follows the body of the paper.]

620. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/


Mr. President:

The attached memorandum from George Ball/2/ presents to you a choice between:

/2/Not printed.

a) permitting the USS *Franklin D. Roosevelt* to fuel and provide shore leave to its
crew at Capetown, or

b) fueling it from an oiler at sea in the same general area.

As you will note, there are two political problems: the possibility that the International Court of Justice decision on Southwest Africa may come out at about the time in July when the ship goes through; and the interpretation that might be put on the trip inside South Africa and elsewhere, in the light of Senator Robert Kennedy's recent visit.

To explore whether this choice could be avoided, I asked Paul Nitze to give me a personal assessment of the options open to the Navy.

He reports as follows:

a) The attack carrier could refuel and have most satisfactory shore leave at Rio de Janeiro; but it means keeping the carrier on fighting station off Viet Nam an extra four days.

b) It could refuel from a tanker at Diego Suarez (Malagasy). The cost of sending out the tanker is between $100,000 and $200,000. Diego Suarez is a town of 4500 people, all colored. At this moment the Navy says that it would prefer to go straight through rather than have shore leave there.

Secretary Nitze concludes that you do have some flexibility here. The Navy would vastly prefer Capetown. But the ship going out contains fresh men, and shore leave is less important than it would be if they had been on battle station for some time. He says that the Navy's willingness to forego shore leave at Diego Suarez indicates to him that the men's situation is not desperate.

I assess the risk of an unpleasant political reaction as about 4 out of 10. The unpleasantness would be moderate, if we hit the 4.

The question is whether, to avoid that risk, you wish either to:

--spend an extra $100,000 or so;
--or hold the present attack carrier on station an extra four days.

Go via Capetown
Go via Rio/3/
Refuel at sea
Refuel at Diego Suarez
Southwest Africa

The President: Groups of U.S. officials should be organized to point up pressing problems in each geographic area. These groups should include the National Security Council area man, the Assistant Secretary of State, an AID official, and a USIA official. They should draw up lists of best quality personnel for their area, organize a reserve of persons to move in when a crisis develops, organize a working relationship with the appropriate Congressional subcommittees, and make a major effort to stay on top of emerging problems.

Under Secretary of State Ball: Presented the background of the Southwest Africa problem speculating that the International Court would rule against South Africa on July 18 on all counts.

After stalling, South Africa will reject the Court ruling and any UN actions to enforce the ruling. The decision will be a blow to sterling, thus creating a major problem for the British. We should avoid supporting economic sanctions against South Africa. We must expect that black Africans will try in the UN to get military and economic sanctions against South Africa.

We are trying to get South Africa to accept the Court's decision when it is handed down. It is doubtful whether we have authority to join other nations in imposing sanctions against South Africa. If the question of sanctions comes up in the UN, the British will be obliged to veto.

No UN action will solve the Southwest African problem, but we cannot give the black Africans the idea we are lying down, nor can we permit a breakdown of the International Court and the international legal system.

Secretary McNamara: No recommendation need be made until we know how the
Court rules. We should limit ourselves to working out a preliminary statement to be made immediately after the Court ruling if it goes against South Africa.

USIA Director Marks: We are working on a statement to be made as soon as possible after the Court rules.

Secretary Fowler: We should look close at the economic factors involved, especially U.S. trade and U.S. investments in South Africa. In addition, the gold problem becomes important because of the large amounts produced in South Africa. The London gold market is losing gold and its future is precarious. In deciding U.S. policy, a major factor should be the impact on the gold problem.

CIA Director Helms: South Africa is one of the least vulnerable countries in the world to economic sanctions.

The President: We should get together all those officials in the U.S. Government who are involved in African problems and work out a statement which could be made from the White House. Arthur Goldberg should be included in this group. We should draft an immediate response to be made as soon as the Court acts and arrange a holding action until we know what our next move is to be. We should stay in close touch with everyone in Congress who is interested in Africa. Possibly, we can relieve some of the pressure which will arise. We should try everything. Even a blind hog may find an acorn.

Secretary Fowler: We should be in touch with officials of private enterprises which have investments in South Africa.

OEP Director Bryant: We should dampen down now African expectations as to what is going to happen when the Court rules.

The President: Reaffirmed the need to organize groups or task forces of U.S. officials.

Bromley Smith

Source: State Department website archives:
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxiv/index.html

For more documents go to the website and scroll down to South Africa.